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METROPOLITAN LIFE AND THE SHADOW
BANKING CONTROVERSY: NON-BANK
INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL
BANKING

by
Roy J. Girasa*
Richard J. Kraus**
Jessica A. Magaldi ***

INTRODUCTION
“Shadow banking” has a great variety of definitions.
The term was originally coined in 2007 by Paul A. McCulley,
who attended the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank annual
symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. The meeting discussed
the financial crisis then occurring nationally and globally. It
focused on systemic risk and, in particular, what the author
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dubbed the “shadow banking system” which he noted was “the
whole alphabet soup of levered-up non-bank investment
conduits, vehicles, and structures.”1
In a series of Staff Reports issued by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, the authors defined “shadow
banks” as “financial intermediaries that provide maturity,
credit, and liquidity transformation without explicit access to
central bank liquidity or public service credit guarantees.”2
Two of these staff authors in a later report defined the term as
“a web of specialized financial institutions that channel funding
from savers to investors through a range of securitization and
secured funding techniques.”3 A comparable variety of
definitions: “The system of non-deposit taking financial
intermediaries including investment banks, hedge funds,
monoline insurance firms and other securities operators”;4 “all
financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a
private or public backstop to operate.”5 “The financial
intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of credit
across the global financial system, but whose members are not
subject to regulatory oversight. The shadow banking system
also refers to unregulated activities by regulated institutions.”6
This article will examine the present controversy
between the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife)
concerning the council’s final determination concerning the
need for the council to oversee MetLife’s shadow banking
activities and the company’s continuing efforts to contest the
rights of the Council to regulate the company’s activities. The
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article will conclude that regulation is indeed necessary in light
of comparable international regulation and the financial
ramifications of the company’s activities.
THE METROPOLITAN LIFE CONTROVERSY
The Dodd-Frank Act Empowerment of the Council
The FSOC was established pursuant to §111 of the
Dodd-Frank Act. The Council’s Board of Governors, among
other matters, identifies risks to U.S. financial stability,
promotes market discipline, and responds to threats to the
stability of the U.S. financial system.7 With respect to nonbank
financial institutions, the Act requires supervision “for nonbank
companies that may pose risks to the financial stability of the
United States in the event of their material financial distress or
failure”….8 The Board of Governors may make
recommendations for the establishment of heightened
prudential standards for risk-based capital and other financial
instruments.
Factors that the Council considers in making a
determination of whether a U.S. company is to be supervised
by the Board of Governors of the Council include (a) the extent
of the leverage of the company; (b) the extent and nature of the
off-balance-sheet exposures of the company; (c) the extent and
nature of the transactions and relationships of the company
with other significant nonbank financial companies and
significant bank holding companies; (d) the importance of the
company as a source of credit for households, businesses, and
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State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the
United States financial system; (e) the importance of the
company as a source of credit for low-income, minority, or
underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of
such company would have on the availability of credit in such
communities; (f) the extent to which assets are managed rather
than owned by the company, and the extent to which
ownership of assets under management is diffuse; (g) the
nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness,
and mix of the activities of the company; (h) the degree to
which the company is already regulated by 1 or more primary
financial regulatory agencies; (i) the amount and nature of the
financial assets of the company; (j) the amount and types of the
liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance on
short-term funding; and (k) any other risk-related factors that
the Council deems appropriate.9
FSOC’s MetLife Inc. Final Determination
On December 18, 2014, the Council designated MetLife as
a nonbank systemically important financial institution. MetLife
is the fourth nonbank to receive the designation as systemically
important. The other nonbanks to receive the designation are
Prudential Financial, Inc. (September 19, 2013); General
Electric Capital Corporation, Inc. (July 8, 2013); and American
International Group, Inc. (July 8, 2013).10 The Council sought
to regulate MetLife as it had regulated other corporations in
order to encourage financial stability.11
Under §102(a) (6) of the Dodd-Frank Act, a company is
predominantly engaged in financial activities if (a) the annual
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gross revenues derived by the company and all of its
subsidiaries from activities that are financial in nature…and, if
applicable, from the ownership or control of one or more
insured depository institutions, represents 85 percent or more
of the consolidated annual gross revenues of the company; or
(b) the consolidated assets of the company and all of its
subsidiaries related to activities that are financial in nature …
and, if applicable, related to the ownership or control of one or
more insured depository institutions, represents 85 percent or
more of the consolidated assets of the company.
With respect to MetLife, the Council issued a lengthy
analysis which included over 21,000 pages of the company’s
submissions. The Council determined that material financial
distress at MetLife could pose a threat to the financial stability
of the United States. The company, therefore, should be subject
to the enhanced prudential standards of FSOC.12 The Council
observed that the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
(MetLife) is a global entity that provides insurance and many
other insurance-related and financial products to some 100
million customers to over 50 countries. As of 2014, in fact, it
possessed some $902 billion in total assets and that its assets
and activities met the 85 percent threshold of Dodd-Frank.
MetLife responded quickly to the determination. In its
January 13, 2015 complaint filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, the company sought review
of the determination in accord with provisions of the Dodd
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act and the United States
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Constitution. The company designated the determination as
arbitrary and capricious and not in accord with MetLife’s status
as an insurance company rather than as a company
predominantly engaged in financial activities as defined by the
Dodd Frank Act itself and the Bank Holding Company Act.
The company noted, furthermore, that the action by FSOC
follows the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board
(FSB), a mostly European body of bank regulators and central
banks in which the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve are members. The FSB had published an
initial list of nine global systematically important insurance
companies that are systematically important financial
institutions. Its recommendations had no force of law and
MetLife had no opportunity to challenge the FSB
recommendations.13
The seventy-nine page ten-count complaint contended
that FSOC’s final determination to designate MetLife as a
nonbank systemically important financial institution was
arbitrary and capricious because, among other matters, (a) the
only independent voting member of the Board of Governors
with insurance expertise as well as the only nonvoting
insurance commissioner on the Council both dissented from the
finding; (b) MetLife was denied due process by the rules and
obligations under Dodd-Frank, the APA and the due process
clause of the Constitution; (c) FSOC made numerous errors
that fatally led to FSOC’s reasoning in its findings; (d)FSOC
failed to give meaningful weight to the existing comprehensive
state insurance regulatory regime; (e) MetLife is not
predominantly engaged in financial activities as required by

2016 / Metropolitan Life / 72

statute which of the failure to meet the 85% rule; (f) the FSOC
failed to undertake activities-based review for insurance
companies; (g) FSOC failed to assess MetLife’s vulnerability
to material financial distress; (h) FSOC’s findings relied upon
unsubstantiated speculation and irrational economic
predictions14; and (i) FSOC failed to examine consequences of
its designation decision.
HISTORICAL SETTING OF TRADITIONAL BANKING
AS OPPOSED TO SHADOW BANKING
Traditional Banking
Traditional banking has had a checkered history.
National banking began at the inception of the New Republic.
The First Bank of the United States (1791-1811) operated
under the leadership of Alexander Hamilton, who was also the
first Secretary of the Treasury under President George
Washington. The issuances of bank notes occurred through
state banks due to the lack of a national currency. In the
seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland,15 the United States
Supreme Court decided that Congress had the right to create a
bank under its power to make “all laws which shall be
necessary and proper, for carrying into execution” its delegated
powers under Article I of the Constitution. In the midst of the
Civil War of 1861-1865, Congress enacted the National
Banking Act16 which established standards for banks including
minimum capital requirements and the issuance of loans as
well as the imposition of a 10 % tax on state banknotes that
effectively removed them from circulation.17
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The Federal Reserve Act of 191318 creates the national
system of banks that has existed to the present day. It requires
all national banks to be members of the Federal Reserve
System and to maintain levels of reserve with one of the 12
Federal Reserve banks. State banks are also eligible to become
members of the Federal Reserve System with all of the
attendant benefits including federal protection of deposit. The
“Fed” conducts monetary policy, supervises and regulates
banks, protects consumer rights, and provides financial
services to the government, financial institutions, and makes
loans to commercial banks. The Great Depression that
commenced in 1929 and ended with the entry of the U.S. into
World War II led to Congressional inquiry concerning the
causes of that Depression. The inquiry noted that there were
bank panics almost every 20 years. It discovered that among
the major causes were the heavy investments in securities by
bank affiliates in the 1920s, serious conflicts of interest
between banks and their affiliates, speculative investments by
banks, and high-risk ventures. Accordingly, the Banking Act of
1933,19 better known as the Glass-Steagall Act, became the law
of the land.
Bank Separation into Classes
Glass-Steagall separated banks into commercial banks
and investments banks. Section 20 of the Act forbade a
member bank from engaging in the issuance, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, distribution, or participation of
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities. Section 21
forbade firms that engaged in the said forbidden activity from
receiving deposits, certificates of deposits, or other evidences
of debt. The payment of interest on accounts was restricted by
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the Act to prevent ruinous competition. As a result bank panics
that occurred virtually every other decade did not occur from
1933 until many decades later apparently as a result of the
removal of the same separation of banks. The passage of the
Riegel-Neal Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 199420
repealed the prohibition of interstate banking by permitting
banks to purchase banks in other states or to establish branches
therein. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
was given jurisdiction over state nonmember banks, the Office
of the Comptroller of Currency received jurisdiction over state
nonmember banks, and the Federal Reserve Board over state
member banks. Applicants for expansion were judged by their
compliance with the Community Reinvestment Bank of 1977,21
which mandated reinvestment by out-of-state banks in the local
communities where they were located.
Repeal of Glass-Steagall
In the 1990s U.S. banks complained that they could not
compete with foreign, especially Japanese multi-service banks
that offered both commercial and investment banking services.
The share of total private financial assets held by these banks
declined from 60 % to 35 % for the period of 1970-1995. As a
result and after four decades of the Glass-Steagall separation
without any major run on banks, the Financial Services
Modernization Act popularly known as the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999 was enacted.22 The first section of the Act
repealed the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and
investment bank. It permitted the creation of a new “financial
holding company” whereby the entity may engage in any
activity that the Federal Reserve Board determines to be
financial in nature or incidental to such activity. It did provide,
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however, that the activity not pose a substantial risk to the
safety or soundness of depositary institutions or to the financial
system generally. Banks could now offer services that included
insurance and securities underwriting and merchant banking.
Before the Glass-Steagall repeal, banks had avoided panics for
twice the usual time period; the banking crisis of 2007-2009
raised issues of the soundness of the Glass-Steagall repeal and
“too-big-to-fail” bank holdings.
Dodd-Frank and Other Reforms
Whenever a financial crisis looms, it is almost
inevitable that governmental regulation is promulgated to solve
or prevent re-occurrence. The thousand-page Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 201023 was
signed into law which contained numerous sub-titles that
sought to alleviate many of the ills affecting the financial
system. Title VI, known as “Bank and Savings Association
Holding Company and Depository Institution Regulatory
Improvements Act of 2010,” explicitly dealt with bank holding
companies created under Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Rather than
restore the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial banks from
investment banks, the major emphasis of Title VI is that a bank
holding company is to be “well-capitalized and wellmanaged.”24 Section 38(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act25 defines “well-capitalized” as follows: “An insured
depository institution is “well-capitalized” if it exceeds the
required minimum level for each relevant capital measure.”
Dodd-Frank raised the standard of well-capitalized to be where
its total risk-based capital ratio is 10 % or greater, a Tier I risk-
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based capital ratio of 6 % or greater, and a leveraged capital
ratio of 5 % or greater.
The Volcker Rule
The already mentioned financial crisis of 2007-2009 led
to the closures of hundreds of banks, somewhat reminiscent of
the closures of the Great Depression. Government had to come
to the rescue of certain banks so that the global financial
system would not collapse. Some believed that the crisis was
precipitated by the repeal of Glass-Steagall; they pointed to the
$6 billion loss by JP Morgan Chase in 2012 with respect to
speculative trading in the U.K. The “Volcker Rule”, named
after the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul
Volcker, was promulgated pursuant to Title VI, §619 of DoddFrank which added a new §13 to the Bank Holding Company
Act. It prohibited an insured depository institution and holding
company controlling an insured depository institution from
engaging in proprietary trading and further prohibited the
sponsoring and investing in hedge funds and private equity
funds. The term “proprietary trading” was given a broad
definition to include acting as a principal or custodian for an
affiliated third party; for a trading account used by the entity to
acquire or be financially involved in short-term resale; the
prohibition of purchasing, selling, or otherwise acquiring or
disposing of stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments for
the bank’s own account. The Rule became effective on July 21,
2012 but allowed banks two years to comply.26
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Additional Prohibitions
Section 939(a) of Dodd-Frank amended the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act to prohibit a savings and loan
association from acquiring or retaining a corporate debt
security that does not meet the standards of the FDIC. There
were detailed considerations set forth in the Act in making the
said determination. With respect to “too-big-to-fail,” it was
noted that in 2011 five banks possessed some $8.5 trillion in
assets (56 % of the U.S. economy).27 §622 of Dodd-Frank,
“Concentration Limits on Large Financial Institutions,”
amended the Bank Holding Act of 1956 to forbid the merger,
consolidation, or acquisition of substantially all assets or
otherwise acquire control by financial institutions if the total
consolidated liabilities of the acquiring financial company
exceeded 10 % of the aggregated consolidated liabilities of all
financial companies at the end of the prior calendar year.
Exceptions which led to even greater enlargement of banks
included acquisition of banks in danger of default.
Section 623 of Dodd-Frank amended the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act to require the responsible agency to
disapprove an application for an interstate merger transaction if
the result of the merger is to permit the insured depository
institution to control more than 10 % of the total amount of
deposits of the insured depository institutions. Among the
practices that caused a threat to the U.S. banking sector were
loans on derivative transactions and other high risk loans. The
total non-secured loans and extensions of credit made by
national banks are restricted by statute not to exceed 15% of
their unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. The total
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loans and extensions of credit by a national bank fully secured
by readily marketable collateral having a market value, at least
at least equal to the amount of the funds outstanding, are not to
exceed 10% of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus
of the association. Dodd-Frank includes in the definition of
"loans and extensions of credit" credit exposure on derivative
transactions; repurchase agreements; reverse repurchase
agreements; and securities lending and borrowing transactions.
State banks are also made subject to the credit exposure limits
with respect to derivative transactions. The Act also places
limitations on lending to insiders as well as to purchases of
assets from them unless the transaction is on market terms,
represents more than 10% of the capital stock and surplus of
the covered bank, and has been approved by a majority of the
board of directors of the institution.
International Initiatives
Additional international regulatory requirements also
appeared. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
composed of 27 countries and Hong Kong SAR, is a forum that
calls for cooperation among member countries on banking
supervisory matters.28 Under the 2004 Basel II Accord, a threepillar framework was established that included (1) risk-based
capital requirements for credit-risk, market risk, and
operational risk; (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy;
and (3) market discipline through enhanced public disclosures.
Basel III entitled “A Global Regulatory Framework for More
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, added technical changes
concerning assignment of risk or certain securitization
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positions.29 Some of the recommendations of the said Basel
Accords concerning the market risk framework were adopted
as a Final Rule by Federal Reserve Board together with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC that
required banking organizations with significant trading
activities to adjust their capital requirements to better account
for the market risks of their activities.30 The Rule modified the
existing market risk capital rule by adjusting the minimum
risk-based capital calculation by the use of new measures of
creditworthiness. It also: (1) modified the definition of covered
positions to include assets that are in the trading book and held
with the intent to trade; (2) introduced new requirements for
the identification of trading positions and the management of
covered positions; and (3) requires banks to have clearly
defined policies and procedures for actively managed covered
positions, for the prudent evaluation of covered positions, and
for specific internal model validation standards.31
In summary, bank institutions are now also subject to
the many statutory and regulatory provisions promulgated after
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. As a result of these
restrictions, there was a decided effort by many financial and
investment institutions to avoid or bypass these onerous
provisions.
Shadow Banking
Shadow banking in essence operates by intermediation,
the matching of lenders with savings to borrowers who need
money by an agent or third party. The agent or third party had
always been a bank, but now non-bank financial institutions
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practice this intermediation outside of the traditional banking
system. This type of intermediation lacks both the protections
afforded to traditional or regular banks but also avoids onerous
statutory and regulatory obligations. In traditional banking
intermediation, banks received deposits from depositors which
then are used to fund loans to borrowers. The FDIC, the
Federal Reserve’s discount window, and other governmental
guarantees offer relative financial safety to these deposits. In
shadow banking financial intermediation, however, and in
particular in credit intermediation, these guarantees are
wanting. It was believed that this intermediation was safe
because of credit lines and tail-risk insurance in the form of
wraps and guarantees that included commercial banks and
insurance companies. The forms of funding included
securitizations such as mortgages, loans, and receivables that
were combined into securities and tranches; and secured
lending backed by mortgages and other assets.32
Although having a serious downturn during the financial
crisis of 2007-2009, it is conservatively estimated that nonbank financial intermediation (“other financial intermediaries”
[OFI]) grew to $75 trillion in 2014 having advanced by some
$5 trillion from the prior year. OFI assets constituted 24 % of
the total global financial assets, half of banking system assets,
and 117% of GDP.33 At the end of 2012, the national
jurisdictions hold assets of non-bank financial intermediaries
were mainly the U.S. (37%); the Euro area (31%); the U.K.
(12%); and China (3%).34 The Financial Stability Board
(FSB)35 divided the OFI into sub-sectors as follows (a)other
investment vehicles composed of “equity funds” ($9 trillion);
“fixed-income/bond funds” ($7 trillion); “other funds, i.e.,
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neither equity nor bond funds ($3 trillion); and representing a
total of $21 trillion and 35% of OFI assets (b)broker-dealers$7 trillion or 12& of OFI, mainly concentrated in the United
Kingdom (UK), U.S., Japan, Canada, and South Korea; (c)
structured finance vehicles - $5 trillion held mainly in the U.S.
and the U.K.; (d) finance companies ($4.5 trillion [8%]) and
money market funds ($3.8 trillion (6%) mainly in the U.S. and
the euro area); (e) hedge funds ($0.1 trillion [0.02%]) but the
figure appears to be underestimated due to omission of offshore holdings; (f) jurisdiction-specific entities including Dutch
special financing institutions, U.S. financial holding and
funding companies.36

RISKS AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING
A central purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to prevent
systemic risk to the entire financial system by entities that are
“to-big-to-fail.” The designation clearly aimed at the several
banks which controlled a vast percentage of deposits, any of
which could bring about the financial collapse of the global
financial system without governmental intervention. The
question arose whether and to what extent shadow banking
poses systemic risks to the financial community both within the
U.S. and abroad. The collapse of Lehman Brothers caused the
tightening of credit standards and banks became much more
risk averse. Risks were then simply transferred from traditional
banks to shadow banks which found it profitable to assume the
risks that traditional banks were no longer able or desired to
pursue. Regulators had paid little attention to shadow banks
and, as a result, payday loans, “crowdfunding,” securitized
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products, money-market funds, and repurchase agreements
became the province of shadow banking. Firms like
Blackstone, Ceberus, and Avenue Capital stepped in to provide
the capital for smaller companies.
The problem is that while some commentators such as
Bill Winters, formerly of JP Morgan Chase and head of
Renshaw Bay, a shadow banking company, believe that the rise
of shadow banking is healthy to the economy, others such as
Professor Steven Schwarcz of Duke University bemoaned the
fact that Dodd-Frank focused on traditional banks and
essentially ignored shadow banking. Schwarcz would remove
the protection of limited liability of managers of shadow
banking firms which creates moral hazard. Manages not having
“skin in the game” are more likely to take risks that expose
their firms to market failure. Most shadow banking firms are
owned and operated by investor-managers who may profit
extraordinarily form high risk exposure but have little to lose
because of limited liability consequence.37 Similarly, Professor
Richard Carnell of Fordham University believes that any
confidence in shadow banking would be misplaced.38
The FSB suggested that systemic risk can arise from the
interconnectedness between the banking sector and the shadow
banking entities, both directly and indirectly. Shadow banking
entities may be directly owned or benefit directly or indirectly
by banks as part of the bank’s intermediation chain. There may
be funding interdependence as, e.g., the holding of the assets
such as debt securities of each other’s assets. There may be
indirect interdependence and risk exposure as a result of

83 / Vol 35 / North East Joural of Legal Studies

investments in similar assets or exposure to common
counterparties.39
Scholars at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
dispute whether the Federal Reserve or the FSOC have the
authority to regulate shadow banks. According to Peter J.
Wallison of AEI and former counsel to President Ronald
Reagan, the Dodd-Frank Act does not give either entity explicit
power to regulate shadow banking. Congress was concerned
with large financial institutions that could pose prudential risk
to the financial system and not with control of transactions with
each other. They are carrying out the recommendations of the
FSB particularly as they relate to money market mutual funds,
which are the major source of short-term funding in the capital
markets. FSOC designated the same three U.S. insurance firms
(AIG, Prudential, and MetLife) that the FSB designated as
systematically important financial firms (SIFIs). The FSB
source of authority is contrary to statutory authority. Moreover,
Title I of Dodd-Frank limits FSOC’s authority to firms it finds
that their material distress or activities could cause instability
to the U.S. financial system. Moreover, Title VIII of DoddFrank gives FSOC the authority to designate firms as
systematically important. Such power may introduce moral
hazards into the relationship between clearing houses and firms
using their services. Title VIII does not set forth standards to be
applied in making this designation.40
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CONCLUSION
The shadow banking system is a major component of
our national and international financial system. The shadow
banking system arose to meet credit demands. At this time the
system arguably is financially greater and more important than
the traditional banking system. The Dodd-Frank Act and other
financial regulations seek to prevent credit lending excesses
that pose substantial risk to the overall financial system of the
U.S. The relatively unregulated shadow banking system
potentially does pose a systemic threat to the financial sector.
As a result, it is incumbent upon Congress and other political
actors to examine the complexity of the shadow banking
system and initiate legislative and other actions to avoid yet
another future crisis experienced less than a decade ago.
Whether or not MetLife will prevail will depend
ultimately on the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation
concerning the limits of an administrative agency’s regulatory
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Environmental
Protection Agency’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act of
1977. In doing so, it engaged in a two-part analysis (called the
"Chevron two-step test"), where a reviewing court determines:
(a) First, always, is the question whether Congress has
spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court as well as the agency must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If the Court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
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not simply impose its own construction of the statute
….
(b) [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific question, the issue for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute41.

The Chevron analysis was upheld in Barnhart v.
Walton.42 The Barnhart decision reversed the Court of Appeals
and upheld the interpretation of the Social Security
Administration with respect to the denial of disability benefits
to individuals who are unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity unless the impairment has lasted or is expect to
last for a continuous period of 2 months. The Court of Appeals
had interpreted the statute that the 12-month period referred to
impairment and not inability to so engage. The Chevron
analysis appears to be limited to a formal adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking. “Interpretations such as those
in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of
which lack the force of law do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.”43 The reason for the limitation given by the
Supreme Court is that internal agency guidelines are not
subject to the “rigors” of the Administrative Procedure Act,
which includes notice and comment.44
Scholars and financial analysts disagree whether
MetLife will succeed in its effort to thwart the efforts of FSOC.
The company’s shares declined slightly the day it instituted the
action dropping 1.2% to $49.81/share. A senior analyst with
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MetLife shareholder Snow Capital Management LP, Anna
Wickland, believed that the litigation would go nowhere.
Michael Barr, a University of Michigan law professor who
assisted in the creation of the Dodd-Frank Act, indicated that
MetLife faced a difficult legal battle to overturn the
designation but Thomas Vartanian, chairman of the law firm of
Dechert LLP that specializes in actions brought before the
oversight council disagrees with the negative views and stated
that MetLife had an excellent chance of prevailing in the
litigation.45
In the light of the importance of shadow banking to our
financial system and referring to previous Supreme Court cases
delineating the powers of administrative agencies, it appears
that MetLife should and will be regulated. Negotiations
between MetLife and the Council, however, continue to this
day with no resolution of the controversy, despite wide-spread
consensus that MetLife and other nonbank financial
intermediation businesses must be regulated.46
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